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STATE GRANTS OF IMMUNITY-THE PROBLEM OF INTERSTATE
PROSECUTION PREVENTION
ALAN D. SINGER
On June 15, 1964 the Supreme Court of the
United States decided two landmark cases-
Malloy v. Hogan,' and Murphy v. Waterfront Com-
mission of New York Harbor2- which have given
rise to a number of problems with respect to the
prosecution, by either the federal government or a
state, of a person who had previously been granted
immunity by another state in return for his com-
pelled testimony.
In Malloy the Court held that the fifth amend-
ment was applicable to the states through the
fourteenth,3 and that federal court standards must
be applied in determining the extent and limita-
tions of the self-incrimination privilege." In arriv-
ing at this conclusion, the Court overruled two
prior decisions.5
A more complicated and more far reaching issue
was presented in Murphy: Whether a state grant of
immunity need protect the witness from incrimina-
tion under federal law, "to which the grant of im-
munity did not purport to extend." 6 The several
defendants in Murphy had been subpoenaed to
testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor, but refused to
testify, even after being granted immunity under a
state law,7 on the ground that their testimony
would tend to incriminate them under federal law.
This contention was challenged by the Commission
on the authority of a 1944 decision of the Supreme
1378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
3 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
4 378 U.S. 1, 11. The court specifically refused to hold
that the availability of the federal privilege to a witness
in a state inquiry would be determined according to a
less stringent standard than is applicable in a federal
proceeding, and concluded: "Therefore, the same stand-
ards must determine whether an accused's silence in
either a federal or state proceeding is justified." 378
U.S. 1, 11.
5 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
6 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964).
1 All immunity for testimony, whether granted by a
federal or state agency, is granted pursuant to statute.
There are 44 federal statutes authorizing the granting of
immunity by various federal agencies, grand juries, and
Congressional committees. See Comment, 72 YALE L.J.
1598, 1611-1612 (1964) for a list of these statutes.
Court in Feldman v. United Staes The Feldman
case had held that a state grant of immunity need
not, in fact could not, protect a witness from prose-
cution under federal law; consequently, a failure to
testify for fear of federal prosecution would not be
sufficient grounds for silence.
The Court was not only unpersuaded by the
Feldman precedent, it specifically overruled it and
held: (a) that the self-incrimination privilege
would be violated if state compelled testimony
could be used to convict a witness in a federal
court, but (b) that once a state granted immunity
in return for compelled testimony, such testimony
could not be used in a federal prosecution.9 One
immediate effect of the second part of this decision
was to revitalize those state immunity statutes
which had carried an emasculating clause pro-
hibiting a grant of immunity whenever it reason-
ably appeared that the witness would be subjected
to prosecution in another state or by the federal
government. 0
Murphy left unresolved, however, such ques-
tions and issues as the following: (1) must an im-
munity statute protect a witness from any prose-
cution for any crime concerning which he testifies,
or is it sufficient that only use of such testimony be
prohibited?; (2) will the holding in the Murphy
case lead to interjurisdictional disputes because the
granting of immunity by one state may, as a practi-
cal matter, all but prevent another from prosecut-
ing the witness?; and (3) assuming that the latter
problem will arise, what solutions are available
short of overruling Murphy?
In discussing these problems, it will be necessary
to describe how, when and why immunity is nor-
8 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
9 The court in Murphy only talked about the state-
federal relationship, and said nothing of a state-state
relationship. It is clear, however, that the latter is to be
included in the holding of the case.
10 The Illinois immunity statute provides that the
court shall deny the state's motion for a grant of im-
munity "if it reasonably appears to the court that such
testimony or evidence would subject the witness to
prosecution, except for perjury committed in the giving
of such testimony, under the laws of another State or of
the United States." Ch. 38, § 106-4 fI1. Rev. Stat.
(1965).
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mally granted. Thus the first part of this Comment
will deal mainly with the procedural aspects of the
granting of immunity, and the traditional extent
of the grant prior to Murphy.
TnE GRANTING oF I muNiTY
Once a witness claims his fifth amendment
privilege, and that claim is upheld by a court," he
cannot be compelled to answer any questions un-
less he is granted immunity coextensive with the
constitutional privilege which the grant of im-
munity supplants.U Prior to the Murphy decision,
the federal rule was that such an immunity statute
must protect the witness from any prosecution for
the offense to which the question relates."3 How-
ever, the dicta in Murphy seems to have changed
this, so that now only use of such testimony, or its
fruits may be prohibited. Under this rule the wit-
ness can be prosecuted if independent, untainted
evidence is available. 4
U The privilege against self-incrimination is deemed
waived unless invoked, and cannot be invoked in ad-
vance of questions actually asked. The privilege can be
invoked in any proceeding, civil or criminal, whenever
an answer might tend to subject the witness to criminal
responsibility for any crime. However, the fact that the
witness claims silence on the basis of the privilege does
not, in and of itself, mean that the silence is justified-
i.e., that the privilege of remaining silent will be
granted. The rule is that the witness must have "rea-
sonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct
answer", and it is up to the court to say whether silence
is in fact justified under this test. See Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951); Rogersv. United States,
340 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 148 (1931).
The Court in Hoffman said: "To sustain the priv-
ilege, it need only be evident from the implications of
the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of
why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result." 341 U.S. 479, 486-
487.
1 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564-565
(1892). The following is a typical immunity statute:
"... such witness shall not be excused from testifying
or from producing books, papers, or other evidence on
the ground that the testimony or evidence required of
him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture. But no such witness shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing con-
ceming which he is compelled ... to testify, or produce
evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding... against him in
any court. No witness shall be exempt under this section
from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed
while giving testimony or producing evidence.... ." 18
U.S.C. 1406 (1962 Supp.).
13 142 U.S. 547. The Court said that for an immunity
statute to be valid it must provide "absolute immunity
against future prosecution." 142 U.S. at 586.
14 The Court in Murphy stated:
"[Wle hold the constitutional rule to be that a state
Mr. Justice White, in his concurring opinion in
Murphy, was of the opinion that the Court had
laid down a new rule: only use of the testimony vio-
lated the constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination. He agreed with this new rule for two
reasons: first, because in his view the states could
not prevent a federal prosecution by a grant of im-
munity; 5 and secondly because the Constitution
does not require protection against all prosecution,
but only requires that the compelled testimony, or
its fruits, shall not be used in a future prosecution
of the witness. In his view it is constitutionally
possible for a federal prosecution to be based on
evidence obtained independently of any testimony
given pursuant to a grant of immunity either by a
state or the federal government.1 6
Although the "use" standard is more consistent
with the purposes of immunity statutes, it does not
seem logical that the Court would overrule by
implication a seventy year precedent barring a
prosecution. If the Court wanted to overrule the
long-standing precedent laid down in Counselinan v.
Hitchcock it could have said so in no uncertain
terms.
Taking the language of the Murphy opinion
literally, it merely says that the federal govern-
ment is prohibited from making use of testimohy
given in a state investigatory proceeding. Thus it
could be concluded that the "use" standard is only
meant to apply to prosecutions by other jurisdic-
tions, while the "prosecution" standard is to
witness may not be compelled to give testimony which
may be incriminating under federal law unless the com-
pelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner by federal officials in connection with a crim-
inal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover,
that in order to implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the State and Federal
Goverments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the
Federal Government must be prohibited from making
any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits. This
exclusionary rule... leaves the witness and the Federal
Government in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a
state grant of immunity." 378 U.S. at 79.
A footnote to this statement said: "Once a defendant
demonstrates that he has testified under a state grant of
immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution,
the federal authorities have the burden of showing that
their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they
had an independent legitimate source for the disputed
evidence." 378 U.S. at 79.
15378 U.S. at 93. It has been held that the federal
government can prohibit state prosecution by granting
immunity from prosecution in any court for any matter
testified to on the basis of the supremacy clause. Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Adams v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 179 (1954).
16 378 U.S. at 106.
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govern in the jurisdiction granting the immunity.17
It is hard to say on what basis such a distinction
can be rationalized in light of the clear language of
Malloy that federal standards are to govern fifth
amendment rights, and these standards are to be
uniformly applied.
A possible explanation is that the Court was
concerned about completely preventing prosecu-
tion in other jurisdictions for crimes against the
laws of those other jurisdictions. Perhaps the Court
felt that the "use" standard would adequately pro-
tect constitutional rights, and at the same time
allow prosecutions for crimes upon "independent"
evidence. This solution seems to be the most
equitable in light of the conflicting interests and
desires of the various jurisdictions-i.e., the desire
of one state to investigate, and of the other to
prosecute.
The difficulty is that in the majority of cases
there is no real difference between the two stand-
ards.is The burden of proof will be great to show an
independent source of evidence, especially if the
prosecutor has knowledge of the fact that the in-
dividual had testified in another jurisdiction. 9 In
such a situation it is almost impossible to show that
knowledge of the testimony did not have some in-
fluence on the prosecutor's investigation, however
slight. The smallest clue derived from the witness's
testimony is enough to bar all the evidence, and
prevent prosecution.
2
'Whatever the Murphy decision was intended to
do to the old "prosecution" standard, it has re-
cently been interpreted as overruling it. A New
York trial court" held the constitutional require-
ment to be only that no "use" be made of the testi-
mony or its fruits. Immunity from any future
prosecution is not required, according to the New
York Court. This seems to be the better rule. The
"prosecution" standard goes beyond the necessary
Constitutional requirement. It is not coextensive
with the fifth amendment privilege, but goes be-
yond it. In the few cases in which independent evi-
dence can be shown the "prosecution" standard un-
1 This is the view expressed by Judge Sobel in The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized", 31
BROKLYN L. Rxv. 1, 46 (1964).
10 See Comment, 73 YALE L. J. 1491,1495 (1964); Note
61 Nw. U.L. REv. 654, 664-665 (1966).
19 Note the publicity given to the recent case of In Re
Grand Jury Investigation of Giancana, 352 F.2d 921
(7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
20 See Comment, 73 YAiE L. J. 1491, 1495 (1964).
21 In re Koota, 35 U.S. L. Week 2046 (New York Sup.
Ct., July 18, 1966). See also, Note, 61 Nw.U.L. Rlv.
654 (1966).
necessarily prevents an indictment and prosecu-
tion of that witness."
IMMUNITY STATUTES
The federal and state immunity statutes can be
divided into two general categories: "automatic"
statutes and "claim" statutes." The automatic
statutes grant immunity for anything which a wit-
ness may say under oath and pursuant to a
subpoena to testify, regardless of whether he claims
the fifth amendment privilege." Claim statutes
grant immunity only after the witness refuses to
testify because of the self-incrimination privilege.2
5
Under an automatic statute, immunity is re-
ceived for any "matter or thing" concerning which
the witness in fact testifies.26 Under a claim statute,
as soon as the witness claims his privilege the
government must then decide whether it wishes to
exchange immunity for testimony. If it does not,
then inquiry must stop." Assertion of the claim
need not be formal. "It is enough if it apprise the
examining tribunal, and the law officers of the
government conducting the investigation, that the
witness is unwilling to answer because the answer
may incriminate him .... 28
The major and traditional purpose of an im-
munity statute is to protect witnesses only against
future prosecution.29 This is because the fifth
amendment privilege itself can only protect against
subsequent use of the statements made. If the
prosecution is impossible because of the running
of the statute of limitations, pardon for the crime,
or like reasons, the fifth amendment cannot be
claimed, and thus immunity need not be granted
to secure the desired testimony. 0 It must be re-
"It is unnecessary because such prevention is not
constitutionally required. The federal exclusionary rule
under the fourth and fifth amendments only prohibits
use of the evidence or its fruits. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
"See Comment, 72 YALE L-. 1568, 1611-1612 (1964)
for a list of "automatic" and "claim" statutes.
1 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
25 "Claim" statutes are distinguishable from "auto-
matic" statutes in that the former specify that immunity
attaches to testimony only after the witness claims the
privilege against self-incrimination. 18 U.S.C. 1406
(1962 Supp.).
26 See statute cited in footnote 12, supra.
"Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949);
United States v. Eisele, 52 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.C.
1943).
" United States v. Skinner, 218 F. 870, 879 (S.D.N.Y.
1914); appeal disnissed 242 U.S. 663 (1916).
2" Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513 (1960).
There are some exceptions to this rule, to be discussed
in the text infra.
0 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The danger
[Vol. 58
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membered that immunity, like the privilege which
it supplants, applies only to criminal proceedings,
penalties and forfeitures. Refusal to testify cannot
be based on fear of retaliation by the person or
persons testified against,3' or on a desire to protect
others.
It has been held that testimony under a grant of
immunity regarding a crime for which the witness
had been convicted, while his appeal from that con-
viction was pending, moots the conviction.u In
Frank v. United States, the court stated: "Congress
has not sought to enable the government to obtain
both such compelled testimony and a conviction re-
lated thereto which is either not yet obtained or if
obtained is pending on appeal... the Government
may not convict a person and then, pending his
appeal, compel him to give self-accusatory testi-
mony relating to the matters involved in the con-
viction."n
Immunity also applies to indictments already
returned, but pending trial. The reasoning in this
situation is similar to that of the Frank case: "the
immunity provision would be ineffective if it did
not apply to indictments already returned and in
which the witness was named as a defendant."
Immunity has also been extended to parole revo-
cation hearings. In United States v. Shillitani,
5
the court said: "If the charges should relate to
matters about which the parolee has testified under
a grant of immunity which covers parole revoca-
tion hearings, the government would have the
burden of showing that its evidence was derived
from a source other than the immunized testi-
mony.";
36
All federal immunity statutes apply to "penalties
and forfeitures" as well as future criminal prosecu-
tions. However, it is not very clear what a penalty
or forfeiture actually is. It is generally said that a
penalty "has reference to punishment imposed for
any offense against the law. It may be corporal or
must be "real and appreciable." 161 U.S. at 598-600.
There is no real danger if prosecution is impossible.
" See In Re Grand Jury Investigation of Giancana,
352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965).
Frank v. United States, 347 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.
1965) cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 923 (1965).
3347 F.2d at 491.
mUnited States v. Niarchos, 125 F. Supp. 214, 219
(D.C. 1954).
35 United States v. Shillitani, 345 F.2d 290 (2nd Cir.
1965), vacated on other grounds, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
36 345 F.2d at 293. It is safe to say that all federal
immunity grants cover parole revocation hearings,
because loss of parole would be a penalty or forfeiture
within the meaning of the statutes.
pecuniary." A forfeiture is distinguished from a
penalty in that it has to do with the loss of prop-
erty, position or some other right. The difference
between a penalty and a non-penalty for the pur-
poses of an immunity statute turns on whether the
statute under which the loss arises is penal or
remedial. A "penalty imposed by the remedial
statute is not designed as a punishment for a public
wrong, but as redress for a private grievance."'"
There have been fine distinctions drawn between
that which is and is not a penalty. For instance, a
proceeding to revoke an architect's registration for
bribery has been held to be a penalty or forfeiture
within the meaning of the immunity statute.P On
the other hand, a proceeding to disbar a lawyer
has been held not to be such a penalty." Treble
damages are also non-penal 4 For this, another
definition has been advanced: "If the object of the
penalty is primarily to punish the wrongdoer, the
action is criminal. If, however ... its primary ob-
ject is to protect the public and to effectuate a pub-
lic policy sought to be accomplished by the act, it
is remedial and is a civil action."4' Treble damages
are thus civil in nature, even though they involve
loss of property as punishment for failure to obey
statutory law. The distinction is not clear. Whether
the primary object of the statute is punishment or
protection of the public, the result is the same-
loss of property for failure to obey the law. The
courts should seek to establish a better definition
which draws a dear line of distinction between
what kinds of penalties do, and do not, fall within
the immunity statutes.
Since immunity is granted by statute, a grant of
immunity can only come when the basic charge
under investigation is one for which an immunity
statute is applicable. However, immunity still can
attach to answers which are incriminating with re-
gard to crimes outside the immunity statutes. The
rule is that "if in the course of such investigation,
in 'responsive' answer to a 'pertinent' question, the
witness gives information revealing a 'criminal
fact' or indeed a 'clue fact' concerning any crime
37 Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymor, 62
So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1952).
33Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Owens, 293
F.759, 760 (S.D. Cal. 1923).
'1 Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymor, 62
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1952).
40Florida Bar v. Massfeller, 170 So.2d 834 (Fla.
1964); In Re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782 (N.Y. 1917).
4 Amato v. Porter. 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied 329 U.S. 812 (1947).
42 157 F.2d at 721.
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(immunity or non-immunity crime) the witness re-
ceives immunity from prosecution for that crime.
43
Most immunity statutes merely give various
administrative agencies the power to grant im-
munity during the course of their investigations.
The basic charge under investigation by these
agencies is not conventional crimes, but rather the
so-called "economic crimes" as investigated by the
SEC or Internal Revenue Service. Only three
federal statutes, and some state statutes, such as in
Illinois, involve conventional "crimes per se."4
Even though a statute deals with administrative
agency or grand jury hearings, immunity will
nevertheless attach if, in the course of an investi-
gation pertinent to the purposes of the statute, a
witness confesses to a "common crime" or divul-
ges a clue which would connect him with that
crime.
Immunity is granted to "all testimony ... inso-
far as that testimony bears a substantial relation
to the subject matter of the [investigation] ;-145 and
an answer bears a substantial relation to the sub-
ject matter if it is responsive to a pertinent ques-
tion.4 "The fact that the precise relationship to
that subject matter is not revealed by the language
of the question does not mean that it is irrelevant
to the inquiry. ... ,,4 All that is required is that the
answer have some relevance to the question.
48 If
the relevance exists, then immunity attaches no
matter what the crime.
TE INTER-JURISDCTIONAL PROBLEM
The major problem created by the Murphy de-
cision is that a grant of immunity by one jurisdic-
tion may foreclose another from indicting or prose-
cuting that witness. The potentiality of dispute
among the various states is great. Each state has an
inherent right to prosecute violators of its laws.
The state also has an inherent right to investigate
crime within its jurisdiction for the purpose of
4 Sobel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
"Federalized", 31 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 1, 15 (1964).
4 Id at 13. These statutes are: (1) Narcotics, 18
U.S.C. 1406 (1926 Supp.); (2) Internal Security, 18
U.S.C. 3486 (1958); and (3) "White Slave Traffic", 18
U.S.C. 2424(b) (1958). The Illinois statute may be
found at Ch. 38, § 106 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1965).
41 United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460, 462 (2d Cir.
1964), reversed on other grounds, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); see
also United States v. Niarchos, 125 F. Supp. 214, 220
(D.C. 1954).
46Sobel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
"Federalized", 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 15 (1964).
11 United States v. Pagano, 171 F. Supp. 435, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
41 Sobel, supra note 46.
prosecuting violators of its laws .4 The problem
is that the exercise by one state of its right to in-
vestigate may foreclose another state from ex-
ercising its right to prosecute.
The answer to this problem is to find a way to
constitutionally curb the granting of immunity by
various states in order to allow other states and
the federal government to prosecute violators of
their respective laws. There are three possible ways
to do this.
The first is a voluntary agreement by the states
and the federal government whereby notice would
be given to other jurisdictions before immunity is
granted to a witness. The purpose of this notice
would be to allow the other states to voice what-
ever objections they may have to the proposed
immunity. In this way arrangements may be
made between the interested jurisdictions to allow
possible prosecution before the witness is called to
testify.-" Of course, the prosecuting jurisdiction
would have to make certain compromises also.
Much would depend on the importance of the wit-
ness to the investigation in the calling state and
the possibility of conviction in some other state.
The possibility that the witness may not testify at
all, even under threat of contempt, should also be
considered.i" It may also be possible to set up some
kind of federal clearing house to facilitate the
transmission of information between the states.
The second proposal is to require the state to ob-
tain the permission of the United States Attorney
General before granting immunity to a witness
whenever the investigation is into criminal conduct
which violates both federal and state lawY.2 The
48 The courts have consistently recognized the exist-
ence of these rights. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
73 (1959). These rights exist so long as they do not vio-
late due process; see N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
80 If, for example, a state is on the verge of indictment,
and the individual's testimony can be postponed till a
later date, then such an agreement can easily be made.
The hard problem is when the investigation is about to
end, and any possible indictment is a year or more
away. Important as the prosecution may be, agreement
to postpone the granting of immunity seems unlikely.
ii There is always the possibility of refusing to testify
because of fear of retaliation by the person or persons
testified against. See Giancana case, notes 19 and 31,
supra.
82 The constitutional basis for such a statute would
be the supremacy clause of the Constitution (Article
VI, paragraph 2). In order to facilitate the enforcement
of federal law, immunity would be prohibited if it would
tend to interfere with investigation and prosecution by
the federal government. In other words, such a statute
is "necessary and proper" for carrying out a legislative




Attorney General would be guided by considera-
tions of equity among the contesting jurisdictions.
Such questions as how close the state is to prosecu-
tion, or how important the testimony is to the
general investigation, would play an important
part in the final determination, either by the At-
torney General or the calling state, to allow or dis-
allow the granting of immunity.
A precedent for this kind of screening device al-
ready exists within the federal framework itself.
Immunity is not granted by any United States
Attorney unless cleared with the Attorney General
first. The decision of whether to grant immunity is
based on two main criteria. First, whether the
witness is high in the criminal or other organiza-
tion under investigation, or only a "middle-man".
If he is not high in the organization, then immunity
may be granted in order to obtain evidence for
prosecution of the men at the top. If he is high in
the organization, or is a flagrant law breaker, then
prosecution may be more important than informa-
tion from him. The second criteria is whether the
witness will offer information important enough to
grant him the immunity, and thus foreclose future
prosecution of him. It may be that he does not
know enough or will not talk for fear of his life, or
the lives of his family." These same considerations
could guide the Attorney General under this pro-
posed statute."
Giving the Attorney General this responsibility
offers the most efficient means of facilitating the
needs and desires of the various jurisdictions,
while at the same time posing the least chance of
interjurisdictional conflict. Organized crime is a
national problem and in order to best protect the
interests of society, the decision, or advice, to
grant immunity should be made by the federal
government. Narcotics, gambling, prostitution,
subversive activities and other problems dealt with
by most state investigations are not peculiar to
that jurisdiction alone. The same problems, some-
times created by the same individuals or organiza-
tions, plague every state and the federal govern-
-' See 72 YALE L. J. 1568, 1600-1610 (1964) for a
detailed description of the considerations for granting
immunity in the Justice Department, and three other
federal agencies.
4 Congress has realized the importance of restricting
the granting of immunity. Under the Narcotics Act
(18 U.S.C. 1406) approval of the Attorney General is
necessary before Congressional committees can grant
immunity. 18 U.S.C. 3486 (1958). Former Attorney
General Brownell has also suggested the necessity of
such approval. See Brownell, Immunity From Prosecu-
tion Versus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28
TiL. L. Rxv. 1 (1953).
ment. Thus the granting of immunity to one leader
of the underworld, or to one conspirator in an anti-
trust violation, can tie the hands of five or ten
other jurisdictions with regard to future prosecu-
tion of this person.
If investigation and prosecution of members of
organized criminal groups or of subversive or-
ganizations are not guided by some central au-
thority, the prohibition of the right of states to
investigate at all may be the only other solution.
This is the third proposed answer to the question,
and should only be proposed as a last resort if
either of the first two do not work. The federal
government can preempt the field of investigation
where violation of existing federal law is concerned,
or where the crime committed is in interstate com-
merce. 55 In the final analysis, however, the degree
of control which must be exerted by the federal
government will depend on the willingness of the
various states to cooperate with each other and
with the federal government. Each state must
realize that its desire to investigate may have to
take second place to the need for putting an indi-
vidual, or members of a group, behind bars some-
where else.
CONCLUSION
The ruling in the Murphy case that the self-
incrimination privilege would be violated if state
compelled testimony could be used to convict a wit-
ness in a federal court, and the all but inevitable
extension of that rule to the states has created a
potentiality of conflict between the various juris-
dictions. Voluntary cooperation may be employed
to combat this conflict, but if this does not prove
successful, or does not satisfactorily curb dispute,
more stringent measures will have to follow. Pre-
emption of the field by the federal government may
become the only answer. Several means of allevi-
ating the problem have been presented in this
paper, and the problem is really one of deciding
how best to insure selectivity in the granting of
immunity. Such insurance may be provided by the
states themselves, or it may have to be "sub-
sidized" by the federal government through regu-
lation or preemption of the field. The answer is not
an easy one, and will depend in large part on the
actual extent of the conflict in the years to come.
'- Many of the operations of organized criminal
groups such as the "Mafia", as well as of subversive
organizations and anti-trust conspiracies are interstate
in nature. They are thus subject to (capable of) the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.
